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Abstract: We determine how an individual can use life insurance to meet a bequest goal. We assume
that the individual’s consumption is met by an income from a job, pension, life annuity, or Social
Security. Then, we consider the wealth that the individual wants to devote towards heirs (separate from
any wealth related to the afore-mentioned income) and find the optimal strategy for buying life insurance
to maximize the probability of reaching a given bequest goal. We consider life insurance purchased by a
single premium, with and without cash value available. We also consider irreversible and reversible life
insurance purchased by a continuously paid premium; one can view the latter as (instantaneous) term
life insurance.
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1. Introduction
Life insurance helps in estate planning, specifically, in providing bequests for children, grandchildren,
or charitable organizations. With this purpose in mind, we determine how an individual can use life
insurance to meet a bequest goal. We assume that the individual’s consumption is met by an income
from a job, pension, life annuity, or Social Security. Then, we consider the wealth that the individual
wants to devote towards heirs (separate from any wealth related to the afore-mentioned income) and find
the optimal strategy for buying life insurance to maximize the probability of reaching a given bequest
goal.
In this paper, we join two hitherto unconnected streams of literature. The first stream is that of
optimal purchasing of life insurance, and most of the research in this area maximizes utility of con-
sumption, bequest, or both. The seminal article in this area is Richard (1975); please see Bayraktar
and Young (2013) for some recent references relevant to the problem of maximizing utility of household
consumption by using life insurance.
The second stream is that of maximizing the probability of reaching a particular target. This
problem has been studied in probability problems related to gambling, as in Dubins and Savage (1965,
1976). For an important extension of the work of Dubins and Savage, see Pestien and Sudderth (1985), in
which they control a diffusion process to reach a target before ruining. For related papers, see Sudderth
2and Weerasinghe (1989), Kulldorff (1993), and Browne (1997, 1999a, 1999b). Instead of controlling a
diffusion, we maximize the probability of reaching a particular goal and allow the individual to purchase
life insurance to help reach that goal, while adding a random deadline (namely, death).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.1, we consider the case for which the
individual buys whole life insurance via a single premium with no cash value available, while in Section
2.2, she can surrender any or all of her whole life insurance for a cash value. In both cases, we compute
her expected wealth at death because her goal is to reach a given bequest, so expected wealth at death
is relevant. Section 3 parallels Section 2 for the case in which insurance is purchased via a continuously-
paid premium; however, we reverse the order of the topics as compared with the order in Section 2.
In Section 3.1, the individual is allowed to change the amount of her insurance at any time; in our
time-homogeneous setting, this amounts to instantaneous term life insurance. By contrast, in Section
3.2, we do not allow the individual to terminate life insurance, so for the remainder of her life, she has
to pay for any life insurance she buys. The solution of th! e problem in Section 3.1 is simpler than and
informs the solution to the problem in Section 3.2, so we present the simpler problem first. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2. Single-Premium Life Insurance
We begin this section by stating the optimization problem that the individual faces. In Section 2.1,
we consider the case for which the individual buys whole life insurance via a single premium with no
cash value available, so she never surrenders her life insurance policy; she may only buy more. In Section
2.2, we incorporate a non-zero cash value and find the optimal insurance purchasing and surrendering
policies in that case. At the end of each of Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we compute her expected wealth at
death.
2.1. No cash value available
We assume that the individual has an investment account that she uses to reach a given bequest goal
b. This account is separate from the money that she uses to cover her living expenses. The individual
may invest in a riskless asset earning interest at the continuous rate r > 0, which actuaries call the force
of interest, or she may purchase whole life insurance.
Denote the future lifetime random variable of the individual by τd. We assume that τd follows an
exponential distribution with mean 1
λ
. (In other words, the individual is subject to a constant force of
mortality, or hazard rate, λ.) The individual buys life insurance that pays at time τd. This insurance
acts as a means for achieving the bequest motive. In this time-homogeneous model, we assume that a
dollar death benefit payable at time τd costs H at any time. Write the single premium as follows:
H = (1 + θ)A¯x = (1 + θ)
λ
r + λ
,
in which θ ≥ 0 is the proportional risk loading. Assume that θ is small enough so that H < 1; otherwise,
if H ≥ 1, then the buyer would not pay a dollar or more for one dollar of death benefit.
In this section and in Section 2.2, we suppose that the premium is payable at the moment of the
contract; as stated above, H is the single premium per dollar of death benefit. In Section 3, we consider
the case for which the insurance premium is payable continuously.
3Let W (t) denote the wealth in this separate investment account at time t ≥ 0. Let D(t) denote the
amount of death benefit payable at time τd purchased at or before time t ≥ 0. Thus, with single-premium
life insurance, wealth follows the dynamics{
dW (t) = rW (t−) dt−H dD(t), 0 ≤ t < τd,
W (τd) = W (τd−) +D(τd−).
An insurance purchasing strategy D = {D(t)}t≥0 is admissible if (i) D is a non-negative, non-
decreasing process, independent of τd, and (ii) if wealth under this process is non-negative for all t ≥ 0.
We include the latter condition to prevent the individual from borrowing against her life insurance.
Remark 2.1. By requiring that D be non-decreasing over time, we effectively assume the individual
cannot surrender any life insurance once she has bought it. In the real world, whole life insurance has a
surrender value that the individual can withdraw, and in Section 2.2, we include that feature.
We assume that the individual seeks to maximize the probability that W (τd) ≥ b, by optimizing
over admissible controls D. The corresponding value function is given by
φ(w,D) = sup
D
Pw,D (W (τd) ≥ b) , (2.1)
in which Pw,D denotes conditional probability given W (0−) = w ≥ 0 and D(0−) = D ≥ 0. We call φ
the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal.
If D ≥ b, then the individual has already reached her bequest goal of b; thus, henceforth, in
this section, we assume that D < b. If wealth equals H(b − D), the so-called safe level, then it is
optimal for the individual to spend all of her wealth to purchase life insurance of b − D so that her
total death benefit becomes b = (b − D) + D. It follows that φ(w,D) = 1 for w ≥ H(b − D) and
0 ≤ D < b. Thus, it remains only to determine the maximum probability of reaching the bequest on
R = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w ≤ H(b−D), 0 ≤ D < b}.
We next present a verification lemma that states that a “nice” solution to a variational inequality
associated with the maximization problem in (2.1) is the value function φ. Therefore, we can reduce
our problem to one of solving a variational inequality. We state the verification lemma without proof
because its proof is similar to others in the literature; see, for example, Wang and Young (2012a, 2012b)
for related proofs in a financial market that includes a risky asset.
Lemma 2.1. Let Φ = Φ(w,D) be a function that is non-decreasing and differentiable with respect to
both w and D on R = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w ≤ H(b − D), 0 ≤ D < b}, except that Φ might have infinite
derivative with respect to w at w = 0. Suppose Φ satisfies the following variational inequality on R,
except possibly when w = 0:
max(rwΦw − λΦw, ΦD −H Φw) = 0. (2.2)
Additionally, suppose Φ(H(b−D),D) = 1. Then, on R,
φ = Φ.
The region R1 = {(w,D) ∈ R : φD(w,D) − H φw(w,D) < 0} is called the continuation region
because when the wealth and life insurance benefit lie in the interior of R1, the individual does not
4purchase additional life insurance; rather, she continues with her current benefit and invests her wealth
in the riskless asset. Indeed, φD < H φw means that the marginal benefit of buying more life insurance
(φD) is less than the marginal cost of doing so (H φw). On the closure of that region in R, written
cl(R1), the equation λφ = rwφw holds.
To help us solve the variational inequality (2.2), we recall that in similar problems (for example,
purchasing life annuities to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin, as described in Milevsky et al.
(2006)), the optimal strategy is to “act” only at the safe level. In our case, that translates into buying
life insurance only when wealth reaches H(b−D), so that φ solves the following boundary-value problem
for 0 ≤ w ≤ H(b−D) and 0 ≤ D < b: {
rwφw − λφ = 0,
φ(H(b−D),D) = 1.
(2.3)
Buying life insurance only when wealth reaches H(b−D) is indeed optimal, as we prove in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.2. The maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal on R = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w ≤
H(b−D), 0 ≤ D < b} is given by
φ(w,D) =
(
w
H(b−D)
)λ
r
. (2.4)
The associated optimal life insurance purchasing strategy is not to purchase additional life insurance
until wealth reaches the safe level H(b−D), at which time, it is optimal to buy additional life insurance
of b−D.
Proof. We use Lemma 2.1 to prove this proposition. First, note that φ in (2.4) is increasing and
differentiable with respect to both w and D on R, except possibly at w = 0. Because φ solves the
boundary-value problem (2.3), we have rwφw − λφ = 0 on R.
Next, we show that φD −H φw ≤ 0 on R:
φD(w,D) −H φw(w,D) =
λ
rH
(
w
H(b−D)
)λ
r
−1 [
w
(b−D)2
−
H
b−D
]
∝ w −H(b−D) ≤ 0.
We have, thus, shown that the expression for φ in (2.4) satisfies the variational inequality (2.2).
The continuation region equals R1 = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w < H(b−D), D < b}; therefore, the optimal
insurance purchasing strategy is to buy additional insurance of b−D when wealth reaches the safe level
H(b−D).
Example 2.1. For a numerical example take the following parameter values: b = 1, r = 0.03, λ = 0.08,
θ = 0.2. Suppose a person has wealth of 0.4 , and carries existing insurance of 0.3. The optimal strategy
is to wait until wealth reaches the safe level of 0.60909 and then buy. The probability that the bequest
goal is achieved is 0.11198.
Remark 2.2. We fully anticipate that the results of this section will hold when one considers other
models, such as more general financial and mortality models, including those that are not time homo-
geneous. Specifically, we expect that when insurance is purchased by a single premium with no cash
5value available, then it will be optimal to wait until wealth reaches the safe level to buy additional life
insurance.
Remark 2.3. Optimally controlled wealth is invested in the riskless asset until it reaches H(b − D);
thus, wealth at time t, before reaching the safe level, equals W (t) = wert, for a given initial wealth
w < H(b−D). The time that wealth reaches the safe level, denoted by τH(b−D), is given by
τH(b−D) =
1
r
ln
(
H(b−D)
w
)
.
The individual reaches her bequest motive if she dies after time τH(b−D); this occurs with probability
e−λτH(b−D) , which equals the expression given in (2.4), as expected.
Because we are maximizing the probability that wealth at death equals b, it is of interest to determine
the expected wealth at death. Expected wealth at death equals E(w,D) = Ew,D(W (τd−) +D(τd−));
thus, from the discussion in Remark 2.3, we have
E(w,D) =
∫ τH(b−D)
0
(wert +D)λe−λt dt+ b φ(w,D),
and the corollary below follows.
Corollary 2.3. Expected wealth at death, E(w,D) = Ew,D(W (τd)), for an individual who follows the
optimal life insurance purchasing strategy of Proposition 2.2 is given by
E(w,D) =


(b−D)
[
1− λH
λ−r
] (
w
H(b−D)
)λ
r
+ λw
λ−r +D, if λ 6= r,
w
[
1
H
+ ln
(
H(b−D)
w
)]
+D, if λ = r.
(2.5)
Remark 2.4. An expectation such as Ew,D(W (τd)) satisfies a differential equation with boundary
conditions. Indeed, via a standard verification lemma, one can show that Ew,D(W (τd)) uniquely solves
the following boundary-value problem (BVP) for 0 ≤ w ≤ H(b−D) and 0 ≤ D < b:{
λ(E − (w +D)) = rw Ew,
E(H(b−D),D) = b.
Because the expression in equation (2.5) solves this BVP, we confirm that it is the correct expression for
Ew,D(W (τd)).
2.2. Cash value available
Standard nonforfeiture laws ensure that an individual who owns a whole life insurance policy can
exchange the policy for its cash value. In this section, we incorporate that feature of whole life insurance
into the model in Section 2.1. Therefore, we allow the process D to decrease, although it is still required
to be non-negative.
We assume that when the individual surrenders her death benefit, she receives a proportion of the
purchase price. (If the cash value is determined according to some other method, such as a proportion
6of the reserve, then one can still express it as a proportion of the purchase price.) Let ρ ∈ [0, 1] be the
proportional surrender charge, so that the individual receives (1− ρ)H for each dollar of death benefit
that she surrenders. The case in which ρ = 1 is equivalent to the case for which no cash value is available,
as in Section 2.1.
Write φs for the maximum probability of wealth at death reaching the bequest b when whole life
insurance can be surrendered. (We use a superscript s to denote that insurance can be surrendered.)
The corresponding verification lemma is as follows.
Lemma 2.4. Let Φs = Φs(w,D) be a function that is non-decreasing, continuous, and piecewise differ-
entiable with respect to both w and D on R = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w ≤ H(b −D), 0 ≤ D < b}. Suppose Φs
satisfies the following variational inequality on R:
max(rwΦsw − λΦ
s, ΦsD −H Φ
s
w, (1− ρ)H Φ
s
w − Φ
s
D) = 0, (2.6)
in which we use one-sided derivatives, if needed. Additionally, suppose Φs(H(b−D),D) = 1. Then, on
R,
φs = Φs.
The regionR1 = {(w,D) ∈ R : φ
s
D(w,D)−H φ
s
w(w,D) < 0 and (1−ρ)H φ
s
w(w,D)−φ
s
D(w,D) < 0}
is the continuation region because when the wealth and life insurance benefit lie in the interior of R1, the
individual does not purchase nor surrender life insurance; she continues with her current benefit. After
Lemma 2.1, we discussed the inequality φsD < H φ
s
w; to review, it means that the marginal benefit of
buying more life insurance (φsD) is less than the marginal cost of doing so (H φ
s
w). Similarly, inequality
(1− ρ)H φsw < φ
s
D means that the marginal benefit of surrendering life insurance ((1− ρ)H φ
s
w) is less
than the marginal cost of doing so (φsD). On the closure of that region in R, written cl(R1), the equation
λφs = rwφsw holds.
To find φs, we hypothesize that the optimal purchasing strategy is identical to the one in Section
2.1. Specifically, the individual does not buy additional insurance until wealth reaches the safe level
H(b −D). Furthermore, we hypothesize that it is optimal to surrender life insurance for wealth small
enough, so that the individual liquidates her assets in order to take advantage of the riskless return. It
turns out that this hypothesis is correct, and we prove this assertion in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5. The maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal on R = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w ≤
H(b−D), 0 ≤ D < b} is given by
φs(w,D) =


(
w+(1−ρ)HD
Hb
)λ
r
, if 0 ≤ w < (1− ρ)H(b−D),
(
w
H(b−D)
)λ
r
, if (1− ρ)H(b−D) ≤ w ≤ H(b−D).
(2.7)
The associated optimal life insurance surrendering and purchasing strategies are as follows:
(a) If wealth is less than (1−ρ)H(b−D), then surrender all life insurance. Thereafter, invest all wealth
in the riskless asset until wealth reaches the safe level Hb, at which time, it is optimal to buy life
insurance of b.
7(b) If wealth is greater than or equal to (1−ρ)H(b−D), then invest all wealth in the riskless asset until
wealth reaches the safe level H(b−D), at which time, it is optimal to buy additional life insurance
of b−D.
Proof. We use Lemma 2.4 to prove this proposition. First, note that φs in (2.7) is increasing, continuous,
and piecewise differentiable with respect to both w and D on R. When 0 ≤ w < (1− ρ)H(b−D),
rw φsw − λφ
s = −
λ(1− ρ)D
b
(
w + (1− ρ)HD
Hb
)λ
r
−1
≤ 0.
In fact, this inequality holds strictly, except when D = 0, in which case the individual has no death
benefit to surrender. For (1− ρ)H(b−D) ≤ w ≤ H(b−D), φs solves the differential equation in (2.3);
thus, rw φsw − λφ
s ≤ 0 on R.
Next, observe that (1 − ρ)H φsw − φ
s
D ≤ 0 on R. Indeed, when 0 ≤ w < (1 − ρ)H(b − D), the
inequality holds with equality, while rw φsw − λφ
s < 0 for D 6= 0; thus, it is optimal to surrender all
one’s life insurance when wealth is less than (1− ρ)H(b−D). When (1− ρ)H(b−D) < w ≤ H(b−D),
the inequality holds strictly; thus, we deduce that it is not optimal to surrender any life insurance when
wealth is greater than (1− ρ)H(b−D).
When w = (1− ρ)H(b−D), the individual is indifferent between surrendering all her life insurance
and surrendering none of it, as far as maximizing the probability that she will die with wealth equal to
b. We assume that she surrenders none of her life insurance when w = (1−ρ)H(b−D) because, for that
wealth, expected wealth at death is greater when she does not surrender her life insurance; see Corollary
2.6 below.
Finally, observe that φsD(w,D) − H φ
s
w(w,D) ≤ 0 on R. Indeed, when 0 ≤ w < H(b − D), the
inequality holds strictly; thus, we deduce that it is not optimal to buy additional life insurance until
wealth reaches the safe level. We have, thus, shown that the expression for φs in (2.7) satisfies the
variational inequality (2.6).
Remark 2.5. We anticipate that the results of this section will hold when one considers other models,
such as more general financial and mortality models, including those that are not time homogeneous.
Specifically, we expect that when insurance is purchased by a single premium with cash value available,
then it will be optimal to wait until wealth reaches the safe level to buy additional life insurance, and it
will be optimal to surrender life insurance when wealth is low enough.
Example 2.2. Consider again the data of Example 2.1, only now suppose that surrender is allowed. If
ρ = 0.5, the success probability of the optimal strategy rises to 0.24487. If ρ = 0.3 it rises further to
0.31703.
As in Section 2.1, it is of interest to determine the expected wealth at death for someone who is
allowed to surrender her life insurance in exchange for its cash value. Computing the expressions in the
following corollary is straightforward, so we leave that work for the interested reader.
Corollary 2.6. Expected wealth at death, Es(w,D) = Ew,D(W (τd)), for an individual who follows the
optimal life insurance purchasing and surrendering strategies of Proposition 2.5 is given by the following
8if λ 6= r:
Es(w,D) =


b
[
1− λH
λ−r
] (
w+(1−ρ)HD
Hb
)λ
r
+ λ(w+(1−ρ)HD)
λ−r , if 0 ≤ w < (1− ρ)H(b−D),
(b−D)
[
1− λH
λ−r
] (
w
H(b−D)
)λ
r
+ λw
λ−r +D, if (1− ρ)H(b−D) ≤ w ≤ H(b−D).
(2.8)
If λ = r, then expected wealth at death is given by
Es(w,D) =


(w + (1− ρ)HD)
[
1
H
+ ln
(
Hb
w+(1−ρ)HD
)]
, if 0 ≤ w < (1− ρ)H(b−D),
w
[
1
H
+ ln
(
H(b−D)
w
)]
+D, if (1− ρ)H(b−D) ≤ w ≤ H(b−D).
(2.9)
Remark 2.6. Note that Es in (2.8) and (2.9) is not continuous at w = (1− ρ)H(b−D), which is due
to the difference between the optimal surrendering strategy of the individual for wealth less than versus
greater than (1−ρ)H(b−D). One can show that Es((1−ρ)H(b−D)−,D) ≤ Es((1−ρ)H(b−D)+,D);
thus, from the standpoint of expected wealth at death, it is better for the individual not to surrender
her life insurance when w = (1 − ρ)H(b − D), even though the probability of reaching b is the same
whether she surrenders all her life insurance or surrenders none at that level of wealth.
3. Insurance Purchased by a Continuously Paid Premium
Section 3 parallels Section 2 for the case in which insurance is purchased via a continuously-paid
premium; however, we reverse the order of the subsections. In Section 3.1, the individual is allowed
to change the amount of her insurance at any time; in our time-homogeneous setting, this amounts
to instantaneous term life insurance. By contrast, in Section 3.2, we do not allow the individual to
terminate life insurance, so for the remainder of her life, she has to pay for any life insurance she buys.
The solution of the problem in Section 3.1 is simpler than and informs the solution to the problem in
Section 3.2, so we present the simpler problem first.
3.1 Instantaneous term life
In this section, we assume that the individual buys life insurance via a premium paid continuously
at the rate of h = (1 + θ¯)λ per dollar of insurance for some θ¯ ≥ 0. Furthermore, we assume that the
individual can change the amount of her insurance coverage at any time. The proportional loading
covers expenses, profit, and risk margin; therefore, we assume that no reserve accumulates. Thus, the
set up in this section is equivalent to the individual purchasing instantaneous term life insurance. With
continuously paid premium for instantaneous term life insurance, wealth follows the dynamics{
dW (t) = (rW (t)− hD(t)) dt, 0 ≤ t < τd,
W (τd) = W (τd−) +D(τd−) .
(3.1)
For this section, an admissible insurance strategy D = {D(t)}t≥0 is any non-negative process. We
do not insist admissible strategies be such that W (t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0 with probability one because of
the constant drain on wealth by the negative drift term −hD(t). Therefore, we modify the definition
9of the maximized probability of reaching the bequest by effectively ending the game if wealth reaches 0
before the individual dies. Define τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : W (t) ≤ 0}, and define the value function by
φ¯t(w) = sup
D
Pw (W (τd ∧ τ0) ≥ b) , (3.2)
in which we maximize over admissible strategies D. (We use a bar to denote that the premium is payable
continuously, and we use a superscript t to indicate that the insurance is term life.) We refer to φ¯t as
the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining.
To motivate the verification lemma for this problem, we present the following informal discussion.
Because D is an instantaneous control, we anticipate that φ¯t solves the following control equation:
λ φ¯t = rw φ¯tw +max
D
[
λ1{w+D≥b} − hD φ¯
t
w
]
, (3.3)
in which the indicator function 1{w+D≥b} equals 1 if w + D ≥ b and equals 0 otherwise. We did not
encounter this indicator function in the problem in Section 2 because for 0 ≤ w ≤ H(b − D) and
0 ≤ D < b, we automatically have w +D < b.
In (3.3), the indicator function equals 0 or 1, and corresponding to each of those values, we choose
D to be a (constrained) minimum because of the term −hDφ¯tw, that is, constrained by either w+D < b
or w +D ≥ b, respectively. Specifically, if the indicator equals 0, then the optimal insurance is D = 0;
if it equals 1, then the optimal insurance is D = b − w. Thus, we can replace equation (3.3) with the
equivalent expression:
λ φ¯t = rw φ¯tw +max
[
λ− h(b− w) φ¯tw, 0
]
.
Denote the safe level for this problem by w¯t. We obtain w¯t by arguing as follows: the income rw¯t
can fund a death benefit of rw¯
t
h
, and we require that sum of this death benefit and the existing wealth
w¯t equals the goal b; that is, rw¯
t
h
+ w¯t = b, or equivalently, w¯t = hb
r+h . Note that w¯
t equals the single
premium to buy whole life insurance of b when the hazard rate used in pricing is h.
These observations lead to the following verification lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let Φ¯t = Φ¯t(w) be a function that is non-decreasing, continuous, and piecewise differen-
tiable on [0, w¯t], in which
w¯t =
hb
r + h
,
except that Φ¯t might not be differentiable at 0. Suppose Φs satisfies the following variational inequality
on (0, w¯t]:
λ Φ¯t = rw Φ¯tw +max
[
λ− h(b− w) Φ¯tw, 0
]
, (3.4)
in which we use one-sided derivatives, if needed. Additionally, suppose Φ¯t(w¯t) = 1. Then, on [0, w¯t],
φ¯t = Φ¯t.
So that what follows does not seem like “mathematical magic,” we discuss how we obtained the
solution to our maximization problem. Because we have a boundary condition at w = w¯t, we worked
backwards from that point. At any wealth level w, the individual chooses either to buy insurance of
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b − w or to buy no insurance. First, suppose that in a neighborhood of w¯t, the individual buys full
insurance of b − w; denote the resulting solution of λ(φ¯t − 1) = −(hb− (r + h)w)φ¯tw, with φ¯
t(w¯t) = 1,
by φ¯tf . Then, φ¯
t
f is given by
φ¯tf (w) = 1− k
(
hb− (r + h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
,
for w near w¯t. Here, k > 0 is some (unknown) constant. Next, suppose that in a neighborhood of w¯t,
the individual buys no insurance; denote the resulting solution of λφ¯t = rwφ¯tw, with φ¯
t(w¯t) = 1, by φ¯t0.
Then, φ¯t0 is given by
φ¯t0(w) =
(
(r + h)w
hb
)λ
r
,
for w near w¯t.
To determine which of φ¯t0 and φ¯
t
f is larger for w near w¯
t, compare their derivatives at w¯t. Because
λ
r+h < 1, limw→w¯t(φ¯
t
f )w(w) = ∞, while (φ¯
t
0)w(w¯
t) is positive, but finite. Thus, for wealth near w¯t,
φ¯t0 ≥ φ¯
t
f . It might be that on some interval of wealth, we have φ¯
t
0 ≤ φ¯
t
f . However, the existence of such
an interval depends on whether λ ≤ r or λ > r. If λ ≤ r, then φ¯t0 ≥ φ¯
t
f for all 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯
t; and, in
Proposition 3.2, we prove that φ¯t = φ¯t0. If λ > r, then there is a wealth level w
∗ ∈ (0, w¯t) such that
φ¯t0 ≤ φ¯
t
f on [0, w
∗) and φ¯t0 ≥ φ¯
t
f on [w
∗, w¯t]; and, in Proposition 3.5, we prove that φ¯t = φ¯tf on [0, w
∗)
and φ¯t = φ¯t0 on [w
∗, w¯t], with the constant k chosen to make φ¯t continuous at w∗.
Proposition 3.2. If λ ≤ r, then the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining is
given by
φ¯t(w) =
(
(r + h)w
hb
)λ
r
, (3.5)
for initial wealth w ∈ [0, w¯t]. The associated optimal life insurance purchasing strategy is not to purchase
any life insurance until wealth reaches the safe level w¯t, at which time it is optimal to buy life insurance
of b− w¯t = rb
r+h .
Proof. We use Lemma 3.1 to prove this proposition. First, note that φ¯t in (3.5) is continuous and
increasing on [0, w¯t], φ¯t is differentiable on (0, w¯t], and φ¯t(w¯t) = 1. Next, note that
λφ¯t = rw φ¯tw,
on (0, w¯t]. The inequality
λ− h(b− w) φ¯tw ≤ 0
holds on (0, w¯t] if and only if
1−
r + h
r
x
λ
r
−1 +
h
r
x
λ
r ≤ 0, (3.6)
for all 0 < x ≤ 1, in which x = (r+h)w
hb
. For λ = r, inequality (3.6) is clearly true. To show inequality
(3.6) for λ < r, define f on (0, 1] by
f(x) = 1− (c+ 1)xa−1 + cxa,
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in which c := h
r
> 0 and a := λ
r
∈ (0, 1), and we wish to show that f(x) ≤ 0 on (0, 1]. To this end,
observe that limx→0+ f(x) = −∞, and f(1) = 0, so it is enough to show that f is increasing on (0, 1].
f ′(x) = (c+ 1)(1− a)xa−2 + caxa−1
is positive on (0, 1] if and only if (c+ 1)(1− a) ≥ 0, which is true. Therefore, we have shown that φ¯t in
(3.5) satisfies the variational inequality (3.4). The optimal insurance strategy follows from the fact that
φ¯t solves the variational inequality with D ≡ 0.
Remark 3.1. When the force of mortality is less than or equal to the force of interest, the individual
feels as if she has time to reach the safe level; therefore, it is optimal for the individual to invest in
the riskless asset and wait until she reaches the safe level before she buys any life insurance. For initial
wealth w, wealth at time t equals W (t) = wert, and the time that wealth reaches the safe level equals
τw¯t =
1
r
ln
(
hb
(r + h)w
)
.
The probability of reaching the safe level before dying equals e−λτw¯t , which equals φ¯t in (3.5), as expected.
From the discussion in Remark 3.1, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. If λ ≤ r, then expected wealth at death, E¯t(w) = Ew(W(τd)), for an individual who
follows the optimal life insurance purchasing strategy of Proposition 3.2 is given by
E¯t(w) =


b
[
1 + h
r+h
λ
r−λ
] (
(r+h)w
hb
)λ
r
− λw
r−λ , if λ < r,
w
[
r+h
h
+ ln
(
hb
(r+h)w
)]
, if λ = r.
(3.7)
Remark 3.2. Note that E¯t in (3.7) uniquely solves the following BVP on (0, w¯t]:
{
λ(E¯t − w) = rw E¯tw,
E¯t(w¯t) = b.
Next, we consider the slightly more complicated case of λ > r and present a helpful lemma, whose
proof we relegate to Appendix A.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose c and a are constants such that 0 < c < 1 < a. Then, the following three
statements hold:
(a) The function f1 on [0, 1] defined by
f1(x) = x
a + (1− x)c − 1
has a unique zero x∗ in the interior (0, 1). Furthermore, f1(x) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ x
∗, and f1(x) ≥ 0
for x∗ ≤ x ≤ 1.
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(b) The function f2 on [0, 1) defined by
f2(x) = 1−
c
a
(1− x)c−1 −
(
1−
c
a
)
(1− x)c
is non-negative on [0, x∗].
(c) The function f3 on [0, 1] defined by
f3(x) = 1−
a
c
xa−1 +
(a
c
− 1
)
xa
is non-positive on [x∗, 1].
We use Lemma 3.4 to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. If λ > r, then the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining is
given by
φ¯t(w) =


1−
(
hb−(r+h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
, if 0 ≤ w < w∗,(
(r+h)w
hb
)λ
r
, if w∗ ≤ w ≤ w¯t = hb
r+h ,
(3.8)
for initial wealth w ∈ [0, w¯t]. Here, w∗ is the unique zero in (0, w¯t) of the following expression:
(
(r + h)w
hb
)λ
r
+
(
hb− (r + h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
− 1. (3.9)
The associated optimal life insurance purchasing strategy is as follows:
(a) If wealth w is less than w∗, then purchase life insurance of b− w.
(b) If wealth is greater than or equal to w∗, then do not purchase life insurance until wealth reaches the
safe level w¯t, at which time it is optimal to buy life insurance of b− w¯t = rb
r+h .
Proof. First, use Lemma 3.4(a) to prove that the expression in (3.9) has a unique zero in (0, w¯t). To
this end, let a = λ
r
> 1, c = λ
r+h ∈ (0, 1), and x =
(r+h)w
hb
; then, the expression in (3.9) becomes f1 in
Lemma 3.4(a). We know that f1 has a unique zero x
∗ in (0, 1); thus, w∗ = hbx
∗
r+h is the unique zero of
(3.9) in (0, w¯t).
Next, note that φ¯t is non-decreasing, continuous, and piecewise differentiable on [0, w¯t], with
φ¯t(w¯t) = 1. On [0, w∗),
(λ− 1)φ¯t = ((r + h)w − b)φ¯tw, (3.10)
and the inequality
λ− h(b− w)φ¯tw ≥ 0 (3.11)
holds if and only if
1−
b− w
b
(
1−
(r + h)w
hb
) λ
r+h−1
≥ 0. (3.12)
In inequality (3.12), let a = λ
r
> 1, c = λ
r+h ∈ (0, 1), and x =
(r+h)w
hb
, as before; then, (3.12) becomes
f2(x) ≥ 0 on [0, x
∗), which we know is true from Lemma 3.4(b). Thus, we have proved inequality
(3.11) on [0, w∗). From equation (3.10) and inequality (3.11), it follows that φ¯t satisfies the variational
inequality (3.4) in Lemma 3.1 on [0, w∗). Because φ¯t satisfies (3.3) with D(w) = b−w when 0 ≤ w < w∗,
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we deduce that for wealth less than w∗, it is optimal to buy insurance in order to reach the bequest goal
b.
On [w∗, w¯t],
λφ¯t = rw φ¯tw, (3.13)
and the inequality
λ− h(b− w) φ¯tw ≤ 0 (3.14)
holds if and only if
1−
r + h
r
·
b− w
b
(
(r + h)w
hb
)λ
r
−1
≤ 0. (3.15)
In inequality (3.15), let a = λ
r
> 1, c = λ
r+h ∈ (0, 1), and x =
(r+h)w
hb
, as before; then, (3.15) becomes
f3(x) ≤ 0 on [x
∗, 1], which we know is true from Lemma 3.4(c). Thus, we have proved inequality
(3.14) on [w∗, w¯t]. From equation (3.13) and inequality (3.14), it follows that φ¯t satisfies the variational
inequality (3.4) in Lemma 3.1 on [w∗, w¯t]. Because φ¯t satisfies (3.3) with D(w) = 0 when w∗ ≤ w ≤ 1,
we deduce that for wealth greater than or equal to w∗, it is optimal not to buy insurance. Instead, it
is optimal to wait until wealth reaches the safe level w¯t = hb
r+h , at which time the individual will buy
insurance of rb
r+h .
Remark 3.3. For wealth equal to w∗, the probability that wealth at death equals b is the same whether
the individual buys full insurance D(w) = b−w until wealth reaches 0 or whether she buys no insurance
until wealth reaches the safe level. So, she is indifferent between these two strategies, and we picked
the buy-no-insurance strategy because her expected wealth at death is greater under that strategy; see
Corollary 3.6 below.
Remark 3.4. When λ > r and when initial wealth w ∈ [0, w∗), optimally controlled wealth at time t
equals
W (t) =
hb
r + h
−
(
hb
r + h
− w
)
e(r+h)t,
which continually decreases and might reach zero before the individual dies. The time that wealth hits
zero is given by
τ0 =
1
r + h
ln
(
hb
hb− (r + h)w
)
.
The probability that the individual dies with wealth at death (including death benefit) equal to b equals
the probability that the individual dies before time τ0, or 1−e
−λτ0 , which equals φ¯t, as expected. When
initial wealth w ∈ [w∗, w¯t], then the individual invests all her wealth in the riskless asset, so that wealth
at time t equals wert, and she does not buy insurance until wealth reaches the safe level w¯t = hb
r+h .
From the discussion in Remark 3.4, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.6. If λ > r, then expected wealth at death, E¯t(w) = Ew(W (τd)), for an individual who
follows the optimal life insurance purchasing strategy of Proposition 3.4 is given by
E¯t(w) =


b
[
1−
(
hb−(r+h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
]
, if 0 ≤ w < w∗,
b
[
1− h
r+h
λ
λ−r
] (
(r+h)w
hb
)λ
r
+ λw
λ−r , if w
∗ ≤ w ≤ w¯t.
(3.16)
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Moreover, E¯t(w∗−) < E¯t(w∗+).
Remark 3.5. On [0, w∗), one can show that E¯t in (3.16) uniquely solves the following BVP:
{
λ(E¯t − b) = ((r + h)w − hb) E¯tw,
E¯t(0) = 0.
On [w∗, w¯t], E¯t in (3.16) uniquely solves the following BVP, as in Remark 3.2:
{
λ(E¯t − w) = rw E¯tw,
E¯t(w¯t) = b.
Next, we present properties of the dividing point w∗. In the interest of space, we omit the proof of
this corollary but invite the interested reader to provide it.
Corollary 3.7. When λ > r, the dividing point w∗ between full insurance D(w) = b − w for w < w∗
and no insurance D(w) = 0 for w ≥ w∗ satisfies the following properties:
(a) w∗ increases proportionally with respect to b, the bequest goal.
(b) w∗ increases with respect to λ, the force of mortality.
(c) w∗ decreases with respect to r, the riskless rate of return.
Remark 3.6.
(a) It is clear that w∗ changes proportionally with respect to b. Indeed, x∗ = (r+h)w
∗
hb
solves
1− (x∗)
λ
r = (1− x∗)
λ
r+h . This equation is independent of b, so x∗ does not change with b; thus, w
∗
b
is constant.
(b) There are competing effects of λ on w∗. For the premium rate h fixed, w∗ increases with λ because
the individual is more likely to die before reaching the safe level w¯t = hb
r+h . Thus, for h fixed, she
is more likely to want to buy full insurance now instead of waiting to reach the safe level. However,
the premium rate h increases with λ, so we have to consider how w∗ changes with h. The safe level
increases with h, which makes the individual less willing to wait to reach the safe level. But, the
premium becomes more expensive as h increases; thus, the individual’s desire to buy full insurance
is dampened. The net of these effects is that w∗ increases with λ; that is, the extra cost of the
premium is not enough to fully eliminate the individual’s greater willingness to buy full insurance
now.
(c) There are two re-enforcing effects of r on w∗. First, the safe level hb
r+h decreases with r, so the
individual does not have to wait as long to reach the safe level. Second, if r increases, then the
individual’s money increases at a faster rate (namely, r) and reaches any level sooner. Thus, w∗
decreases with r because the individual is more willing to wait to reach the safe level.
(d) We found examples that demonstrate that w∗ might decrease with θ¯ or might increase with θ¯. There
are two competing effects of θ¯ on w∗ as discussed in part (b) above: increasing the safe level versus
increasing the premium. If the effect of increasing the premium is larger than that of increasing the
safe level, then w∗ decreases with θ¯, and vice versa.
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Example 3.1. To demonstrate the discussion in Remark 3.6, we present this numerical example. For our
base scenario, take the following parameter values: b = 1, r = 0.03, λ = 0.08, and h = (1+0.25)λ = 0.10.
Thus, the safe level equals 1013 = 0.7692, and w
∗ = 0.6949.
(a) First, we show numerically that w∗ increases with respect to λ, while keeping θ¯ = 0.25. Write w∗(λ)
to denote w∗’s dependence on λ in this example. We have w∗(0.04) = 0.0873, w∗(0.05) = 0.3323,
w∗(0.06) = 0.5118, and w∗(0.08) = 0.6949.
(b) Next, we show numerically that w∗ decreases with respect to r. Write w∗(r) to denote w∗’s de-
pendence on r in this example. Recall that r < λ, so we will consider r ∈ [0, 0.08). We have
w∗(0.00) = 1.0000, w∗(0.01) = 0.9091, w∗(0.02) = 0.8333, w∗(0.03) = 0.6949, w∗(0.04) = 0.5118,
w∗(0.05) = 0.2864, w∗(0.06) = 0.0873, and w∗(0.07) = 0.0030.
(c) Finally, we show numerically that w∗ might decrease or increase with respect to h, while keeping
λ fixed–that is, we vary θ¯. Write w∗(h) to denote w∗’s dependence on h in this example. First,
w∗(0.08) = 0.7054, w∗(0.10) = 0.6949, and w∗(0.15) = 0.6197. So, w∗ decreases with h when
λ = 0.08. Next, let λ = 0.12; then, w∗(0.12) = 0.7992, w∗(0.15) = 0.8193, w∗(0.20) = 0.8101, and
w∗(0.25) = 0.7838. So, w∗ first increases and then decreases with h when λ = 0.12.
Remark 3.7. We now summarize what we have learned in this section and clarify some of the results.
Suppose the individual decides to start buying full insurance at a wealth level w that is less than the safe
level. This is a winning move if she dies before time τ0, the time at which her wealth is depleted to zero;
on the other hand, waiting to buy until after reaching the safe level is the winning move if she lives to
time τw¯t . Therefore, by letting p(t) = e
−λt denote the probability of living to time t, the better strategy
is to buy full insurance if 1− p(τ0) ≥ p(τw¯t), that is, p(τ0) + p(τw¯t) ≤ 1, while the better strategy is to
wait if the inequality goes the other way.
We see, therefore, that w∗ is precisely the wealth level that results in
p(τ0) + p(τw¯t) = 1.
We can see from this equation that any changes that cause both τ0 and τw¯t to increase will decrease
both probabilities and thereby increase w∗, while changes that cause both times to decrease (such as an
increase in r) will decrease w∗. For changes that cause the two times to move in different directions, the
effect can be uncertain, as we noticed above for an increase in h, which causes τw¯t to increase but τ0 to
decrease.
3.2 Irreversible whole life
In this section, we assume that once the individual buys a given amount of insurance D, then she
must pay premium at the rate of hD for the remainder of her life. She cannot reverse this purchase.
Wealth follows the process given in (3.1). Denote the maximum probability of dying with wealth at least
b before ruining by φ¯; it is defined as in (3.2), except that the definition of admissible strategy differs in
this case. Indeed, an insurance purchasing strategy D = {D(t)}t≥0 is admissible if D is a non-negative
and non-decreasing process.
In the case for irreversible whole life insurance with premium payable continuously, the safe level
differs depending on the existing amount of life insurance D. Indeed, for a given level of wealth w, the
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individual can safely invest it in the riskless asset and earn investment income at the rate of rw. Because
the individual already has a death benefit of D, at the safe level, this income must be sufficient to cover
the insurance premium; that is, rw ≥ hD, or equivalently, w ≥ hD
r
.
Moreover, if D is less than rb
r+h , then we have the safe level from Section 3.1, namely
hb
r+h . Thus,
the safe level when life insurance is irreversible is given by
w¯(D) = max
[
hb
r + h
,
hD
r
]
=
{
hb
r+h , if D ≤
rb
r+h ,
hD
r
, if D > rb
r+h .
The verification lemma for φ¯ is as follows.
Lemma 3.8. Let Φ¯ = Φ¯(w,D) be a function that is non-decreasing, continuous, and piecewise differ-
entiable with respect to both w and D on R¯ = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯(D), D ≥ 0}. Suppose Φ¯ satisfies the
following variational inequality on R¯:
max
(
(rw − hD)Φ¯w − λ
(
Φ¯− 1{w+D≥b}
)
, Φ¯D
)
= 0, (3.17)
in which we use one-sided derivatives, if needed. Additionally, suppose Φ¯(w¯(D),D) = 1. Then, on R¯,
φ¯ = Φ¯.
When D ≥ b, the optimal life insurance purchasing strategy is not to buy any additional life
insurance because D already meets the targeted bequest. The goal for the individual is not to ruin while
paying the premium rate hD. Thus, in this case, φ¯ solves the following BVP:

λ
(
φ¯− 1
)
= (rw − hD)φ¯w,
φ¯
(
hD
r
,D
)
= 1.
We give the solution to this BVP in the next proposition; we leave it to the reader to show that it
satisfies variational inequality (3.17) of Lemma 3.8.
Proposition 3.9. On R¯0 = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w ≤
hD
r
, D ≥ b}, the maximum probability of reaching the
bequest goal before ruining is given by
φ¯(w,D) = 1−
(
hD − rw
hD
)λ
r
. (3.18)
The associated optimal insurance purchasing strategy is not to buy any additional insurance.
Remark 3.8. When D ≥ b and when initial wealth w lies in
[
0, hD
r
]
, optimally controlled wealth at
time t equals
W (t) =
hD
r
−
(
hD
r
− w
)
ert,
which decreases over time. Thus, wealth will never reach the safe level, and the relevant hitting time is
the hitting time of zero wealth, τ0, which equals
τ0 =
1
r
ln
(
hD
hD − rw
)
.
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The probability that the individual dies with wealth at death equal to at least b is the probability that
she dies before time τ0, or 1− e
−λτ0 , which equals (3.18), as expected.
There is an interesting analogy between the case for which D ≥ b and the case, in Section 3.1, for
which λ > r and initial wealth w ∈ [0, w∗). Indeed, by examining the above expression for W (t) with
the one given in Remark 3.4, we see that we can get the former from the latter by replacing D and r
with b and r + h, respectively. The hitting times of zero similarly correspond, as do the probabilities of
dying before wealth reaches 0. In other words, we can get (3.18) from the first expression in (3.8) by
replacing b and r + h with D and r, respectively.
From the discussion in Remark 3.8, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.10. If D ≥ b, then expected wealth at death, E¯(w,D) = Ew,D(W (τd)), for an individual
who follows the optimal life insurance purchasing strategy of Proposition 3.9 is given by
E¯(w,D) =


D
(
1− h
λ−r
)(
1−
(
hD−rw
hD
)λ
r
)
+ λw
λ−r , if λ 6= r,
hD−rw
r
ln
(
hD−rw
hD
)
+ (r+h)w
h
, if λ = r.
(3.19)
Remark 3.9. If D ≥ b, then E¯ in (3.19) uniquely solves the following BVP for 0 ≤ w ≤ hD
r
:
{
λ(E¯ − (w +D)) = (rw − hD) E¯w,
E¯ (0,D) = 0.
Henceforth, we assume that D < b, and we will require that φ¯ be continuous across D = b. We
propose the following ansatz for optimally purchasing life insurance, in which w and D are initial wealth
and death benefit, respectively:
(a) Suppose b − D ≤ w ≤ hD
r
and rb
r+h < D < b; then, hypothesize that the individual will buy no
additional life insurance if w > b −D. If wealth reaches the value b − D, then, via instantaneous
control of the death benefit, wealth and death benefit will stay on the line w′ + D′ = b, moving
toward the point (w′,D′) = (0, b).
(b) Suppose 0 ≤ D < b− w and 0 ≤ w ≤ hb
r+h .
(i) Hypothesize that if (w,D) is “close enough” to the line w′ +D′ = b, then the individual will
buy additional life insurance of b− (w +D) and thereafter will keep wealth and death benefit
on the line w′ +D′ = b. We expect points on the line rw′ = hD′ to lie in this “jump” region;
otherwise, from the differential equation in (3.17), we have φ¯ = 0 along rw′ = hD′, which is
not true.
(ii) Hypothesize that if w is “close enough” to the safe level hb
r+h , then the individual will buy no
additional insurance until her wealth reaches the safe level. Inherent in this part of the ansatz
is that D < rb
r+h , so that the safe level equals w =
hb
r+h .
We will (slightly) abuse notation below by referring to φ¯ as the solution of various boundary-value
problems resulting from the above ansatz. However, as we progress, we will prove that the φ¯ we thus
obtain is indeed the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining.
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Region R¯a = {(w,D) : b − D ≤ w ≤
hD
r
, rb
r+h < D < b}: Based on part (a) of the ansatz, the
maximum probability of reaching the bequest before ruining solves the following BVP:


λ(φ¯− 1) = (rw − hD)φ¯w,
φ¯D(b−D,D) = 0,
φ¯
(
hD
r
,D
)
= 1, lim
D→b−
φ¯(w,D) = 1−
(
hb− rw
hb
)λ
r
.
(3.20)
The condition that φ¯D = 0 at w = b−D arises from the ansatz that the individual purchases insurance
continuously along that line. The last condition comes from requiring continuity at D = b; alternatively,
we could simply require that lim(w,D)→(0+,b−) φ¯(w,D) = 0 and then check that continuity at D = b
holds. The solution of (3.20) is given by
φ¯(w,D) = 1−
(
(r + h)D − rb
hb
) λ
r+h
(
hD − rw
(r + h)D − rb
)λ
r
. (3.21)
In the next proposition, we state that φ¯ in (3.21) equals the maximum probability of reaching the
bequest goal; one can prove this proposition via Lemma 3.8.
Proposition 3.11. On R¯a = {(w,D) : b − D ≤ w ≤
hD
r
, rb
r+h < D < b}, the maximum probability
of reaching the bequest goal before ruining is given by φ¯ in (3.21). The associated optimal insurance
purchasing strategy is to buy additional insurance only when wealth reaches b−D, after which continually
buy additional insurance to ensure that the sum of wealth and death benefit equals b.
Remark 3.10. For initial wealth and death benefit lying in the interior of R¯a, optimally controlled
wealth at time t equals
W (t) =
hD
r
−
(
hD
r
− w
)
ert,
which decreases over time. Thus, wealth will never reach the safe level, and the first relevant hitting
time is the time that wealth reaches b−D, τb−D, which equals
τb−D =
1
r
ln
(
(r + h)D − rb
hD − rw
)
.
After wealth reaches b−D, the individual continually buys life insurance to keep wealth plus death
benefit equal to b. It follows from Remark 3.4, that at time t = τb−D + s for s ≥ 0, optimally controlled
wealth equals
W (t) =
hb
r + h
−
(
D −
rb
r + h
)
e(r+h)s,
which decreases over time. Thus, the second relevant hitting time is the hitting time of zero,
τ0 =
1
r + h
ln
(
hb
(r + h)D − rb
)
,
which we measure from time τb−D. The probability that the individual dies with wealth at death of at
least b equals the probability that she dies before time τb−D plus the probability that she dies before
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time τ0 given that she dies after time τb−D, or
(
1− e−λτb−D
)
+ e−λτb−D
(
1− e−λτ0
)
= 1− e−λ(τ0+τb−D),
which equals the expression in (3.21), as expected.
From the discussion in Remark 3.10, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.12. For (w,D) ∈ R¯a, expected wealth at death for an individual who follows the optimal
life insurance purchasing strategy of Proposition 3.11 is given by
E¯(w,D) =


(
hD−rw
(r+h)D−rb
)λ
r
[
(r+h)D
λ−r − b
{
r
λ−r +
(
(r+h)D−rb
hb
) λ
r+h
}]
+D
[
1− h
λ−r
]
+ λw
λ−r , if λ 6= r,
w +D − hD−rw
r
ln
(
(r+h)D−rb
hD−rw
)
− hD−rw
h
(
hb
(r+h)D−rb
) h
r+h
, if λ = r.
(3.22)
Remark 3.11. For (w,D) ∈ R¯a, E¯ in (3.22) uniquely solves the following BVP:{
λ(E¯ − (w +D)) = (rw − hD) E¯w,
E¯D (b−D,D) = 0, E¯(w, b) = e¯(w),
in which
e¯(w) =


b
(
1− h
λ−r
)(
1−
(
hb−rw
hb
)λ
r
)
+ λw
λ−r , if λ 6= r,
hb−rw
r
ln
(
hb−rw
hb
)
+ (r+h)w
h
, if λ = r.
The boundary condition at D = b comes from continuity of E¯ across D = b; thus, e¯ is obtained via the ex-
pressions in (2.22a) with D = b. Alternatively, we could simply require that lim(w,D)→(0+,b−) E¯(w,D) =
0 and then check that continuity at D = b holds.
Region R¯b = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ D < b− w, 0 ≤ w ≤
hb
r+h}: Based on part (b)(i) of the ansatz, for (w,D)
“close enough” to the line w′ + D′ = b, the individual immediately buys additional life insurance of
b− (w+D). Thus, φ¯ is given by φ¯(w,D) = φ¯(w, b−w), in which the right side is given by (3.21). Thus,
φ¯(w,D) = 1−
(
hb− (r + h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
. (3.23)
Based on part (b)(ii) of the ansatz, for w “close enough” to the safe level hb
r+h , assuming that
D < rb
r+h , φ¯ solves the following BVP: 

λφ¯ = (rw − hD)φ¯w,
φ¯
(
hb
r + h
,D
)
= 1.
(3.24)
The solution of (3.24) is given by
φ¯(w,D) =

 rw − hD
h
(
rb
r+h −D
)


λ
r
. (3.25)
To obtain (3.25), we assume that rw − hD > 0 when w < hb
r+h ; otherwise, if the line rw = hD is in the
continuation region, the differential equation in (3.24) implies that φ¯ = 0 along rw = hD, which is not
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true. Also, in writing (3.25), we mean that φ¯ = 1 if w = hb
r+h and D =
rb
r+h because that point is in the
safe region.
Next, we find the boundary between the jump region underlying the expression in (3.23) and the
continuation region underlying the expression in (3.25). It turns out that we can express this boundary
as a function D = Dj(w); subscript j for jump. We require φ¯ to be continuous along that boundary;
that is, we require
1−
(
hb− (r + h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
=

 rw − hDj(w)
h
(
rb
r+h −Dj(w)
)


λ
r
.
Solving this equation for Dj for 0 ≤ w <
hb
r+h yields
Dj(w) =
r
h
w − hb
r+hfj(w)
1− fj(w)
, (3.26)
in which fj is given by
fj(w) =
[
1−
(
hb− (r + h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
] r
λ
. (3.27)
Because fj
(
hb
r+h
)
= 1, we define Dj
(
hb
r+h
)
by continuity; specifically, set Dj
(
hb
r+h
)
= rb
r+h . For what
comes later, it is important to understand the graph of Dj on
[
0, hb
r+h
]
. See Appendix B for the proof
of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.13. Let the function D = Dj(w) be defined by equations (3.26) and (3.27), for 0 ≤ w <
hb
r+h ,
and define Dj
(
hb
r+h
)
= rb
r+h .
(a) Dj(w) ≤
rw
h
, with equality only at w = 0 and w = hb
r+h .
(b) If λ ≤ r, then Dj(w) increases from 0 to
rb
r+h as w increases from 0 to
hb
r+h .
(c) If λ > r, then Dj(w) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ w ≤ w
∗, and Dj(w) increases from 0 to
rb
r+h as w increases from
w∗ to hb
r+h , in which w
∗ is the unique zero of the expression in (3.9) in Proposition 3.4.
From Lemma 3.13, we see that there are two cases to consider: λ ≤ r and λ > r, as there were for
the problem in Section 3.1. In the next two propositions, we prove that φ¯ given in (3.23) and (3.25),
patched together along D = Dj(w), satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.8. In the first, we consider
λ ≤ r; in the second, λ > r.
Proposition 3.14. Suppose λ ≤ r. On R¯b = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ D < b − w, 0 ≤ w ≤
hb
r+h}, the maximum
probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining is given by
φ¯(w,D) =


(
rw−hD
h( rbr+h−D)
)λ
r
, if 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w),
1−
(
hb−(r+h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
, if Dj(w) < D ≤ b− w.
(3.28)
The associated optimal insurance purchasing strategy is as follows:
(a) If 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w), then do not buy additional insurance until wealth reaches the safe level
hb
r+h , at
which time, buy additional insurance of rb
r+h −D.
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(b) If Dj(w) < D ≤ b − w, then immediately buy additional insurance of b − (w + D) and thereafter
continually buy additional insurance to ensure that the sum of wealth and death benefit equals b.
Proof. The function φ¯ is increasing and piecewise differentiable in w and D, and it equals 1 at w = hb
r+h .
Recall that we defined φ¯ in (3.25) to be equal to 1 when w = hb
r+h and D =
rb
r+h . From the definition of
Dj(w), we know that φ¯ in (3.28) is continuous in R¯b; it is also continuous with φ¯ given in (3.21) across
the line w +D = b. It remains to show that φ¯ satisfies the variational inequality (3.17).
If 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w), then (rw − hD)φ¯w − λφ¯ = 0 by derivation of the expression in (3.25). The
inequality φ¯D ≤ 0 holds on this subregion because, in the interior,
φ¯D(w,D) ∝
1
rb
r+h −D
−
h
rw − hD
,
which is negative because w < hb
r+h , and because rw > hD and D <
rb
r+h when D < Dj(w).
If Dj(w) < D ≤ b − w, then clearly φ¯D = 0. The inequality (rw − hD)φ¯w − λφ¯ ≤ 0 holds on this
subregion if and only if
D ≥ (b− w)− b
(
hb− (r + h)w
hb
)1− λ
r+h
=: D0(w). (3.29)
Thus, it is enough to show that D0(w) ≤ Dj(w). This inequality holds with equality at w = 0 and
w = hb
r+h , so we only need to show it for 0 < w <
hb
r+h . By setting z =
(
hb−(r+h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
, the inequality
D0(w) ≤ Dj(w) for 0 < w <
hb
r+h becomes
(1− z)1−
r
λ − 1 +
h
r + h
z ≥ 0,
for 0 < z < 1. This inequality holds because the left side equals 0 for z = 0, and the left side increases
on (0, 1) because λ ≤ r.
We have, thus, shown that φ¯ in (3.28) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.8, so we conclude that φ¯
is the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining.
Remark 3.12. If λ ≤ r, then on the subregion of R¯b for which 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w), optimally controlled
wealth at time t equals
W (t) =
hD
r
+
rw − hD
r
ert,
which increases towards the safe level hb
r+h . The hitting time of
hb
r+h equals
τ hb
r+h
=
1
r
ln

h
(
rb
r+h −D
)
rw − hD

 .
The probability that the individual dies with wealth at death equal to b is the probability that she dies
after time τ hb
r+h
, or e
−λτ hb
r+h , which equals the expression in (3.25), as expected.
On the subregion of R¯b for which Dj(w) < D ≤ b− w, the individual immediately buys additional
insurance of b− (w+D) and thereafter continually buys insurance to stay on the line w′+D′ = b. From
Remark 3.4, it follows that optimally controlled wealth at time t equals
W (t) =
hb
r + h
−
(
hb
r + h
− w
)
e(r+h)t,
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which continually decreases and might reach zero before the individual dies. The time that wealth hits
zero depends on w:
τ0 =
1
r + h
ln
(
hb
hb− (r + h)w
)
.
The probability that the individual dies with wealth at death equal to b equals the probability that the
individual dies before time τ0, or 1− e
−λτ0 , which equals the expression in (3.23), as expected.
Corollary 3.15. If λ ≤ r, then expected wealth at death on the subregion of R¯b for which 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w)
is given by the following expression when the individual follows the optimal life insurance purchasing
strategy in Proposition 3.14:
E¯(w,D) =


{
(b−D)
[
1 + h
r+h
λ
r−λ
]
− hD
r−λ
[
1− λ
r+h
]}(
rw−hD
h( rbr+h−D)
)λ
r
+D r+h−λ
r−λ −
λw
r−λ , if λ < r,
rw−hD
r
ln
(
h( rbr+h−D)
rw−hD
)
+ r+h
r
w, if λ = r.
(3.30)
If λ ≤ r, then expected wealth at death on the subregion of R¯b for which Dj(w) < D ≤ b−w is given by
E¯(w,D) = b
[
1−
(
hb− (r + h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
]
. (3.31)
Proof. From the discussion in Remark 3.12, we deduce that, for 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w),
E¯(w,D) =
∫ τ
0
(
hD
r
+
rw − hD
r
ert +D
)
λe−λt dt+ b φ¯(w,D),
from which the expressions in (3.30) follow. To obtain (3.31) for Dj(w) < D < b−w, recall that (w,D)
immediately jumps to (w, b − w) and thereafter stays on the line w′ + D′ = b. Thus, we can use the
work in Corollary 3.6 to deduce that E¯(w,D) = E¯t(w), in which E¯t is given by the first expression in
(3.16).
Remark 3.13. If λ ≤ r, then expected wealth at death on the subregion of R¯b for which 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w)
solves the following BVP: 

λ(E¯ − (w +D)) = (rw − hD) E¯w,
E¯
(
hb
r + h
,D
)
= b.
On the subregion for which Dj(w) < D < b−w, expected wealth at death solves the first BVP given in
Remark 3.5.
Proposition 3.16. Suppose λ > r. On R¯b = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ D < b − w, 0 ≤ w ≤
hb
r+h}, the maximum
probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining is given by
φ¯(w,D) =


(
rw−hD
h( rbr+h−D)
)λ
r
, if 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w) and w
∗ ≤ w ≤ hb
r+h ,
1−
(
hb−(r+h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
, otherwise.
(3.32)
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Here, w∗ is the unique zero in
(
0, hb
r+h
)
of the expression in (3.9). The associated optimal insurance
purchasing strategy is as follows:
(a) If 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w), then do not buy additional insurance until wealth reaches the safe level
hb
r+h , at
which time, buy additional insurance of rb
r+h −D.
(b) Otherwise, immediately buy additional insurance of b − (w + D) and thereafter continually buy
additional insurance to ensure that the sum of wealth and death benefit equals b.
Proof. The function φ¯ is increasing and piecewise differentiable in w and D, and it equals 1 at w = hb
r+h .
Recall that we defined φ¯ in (3.25) to be equal to 1 when w = hb
r+h and D =
rb
r+h . From the definition of
Dj(w), we know that φ¯ in (3.32) is continuous in R¯b; it is also continuous with φ¯ given in (3.21) across
the line w +D = b. It remains to show that φ¯ satisfies the variational inequality (3.17).
If 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w) and w
∗ ≤ w ≤ hb
r+h , then (rw − hD)φ¯w − λφ¯ = 0 by derivation of the expression
in (3.25). The proof of Proposition 3.14 shows us that the inequality φ¯D ≤ 0 holds on this subregion.
If 0 ≤ D ≤ b−w and 0 ≤ w < w∗ or if Dj(w) < D ≤ b−w and w
∗ ≤ w ≤ hb
r+h , then clearly φ¯D = 0.
The inequality (rw − hD)φ¯w − λφ¯ ≤ 0 holds on this subregion if and only if D ≥ D0(w), in which D0
is given in (3.29). Thus, we must show that D0(w) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ w < w
∗ and that D0(w) ≤ Dj(w) for
w∗ ≤ w ≤ hb
r+h . The inequality D0(w) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ w < w
∗ is equivalent to f2(x) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ x
∗, in
which x = (r+h)w
hb
and f2 and x
∗ are as in Lemma 3.4. From Lemma 3.4, we know that f2(x) ≥ 0 for
0 ≤ x ≤ x∗, so we have proved the inequality (rw − hD)φ¯w − λφ¯ ≤ 0 on this subregion.
We next demonstrate the inequality D0(w) ≤ Dj(w) for w
∗ ≤ w ≤ hb
r+h . We know that the
inequality holds with equality at w = hb
r+h ; thus, we only need to prove it for w
∗ ≤ w < hb
r+h . By setting
x = fj(w) and simplifying, this inequality becomes
1−
r + h
r
x
λ
r
−1 +
h
r
x
λ
r ≤ 0
for x∗ ≤ x < 1, which holds because the left side is f3 of Lemma 3.4 when we set a =
λ
r
and c = λ
r+h .
We have shown that φ¯ in (3.32) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.8. Thus, φ¯ is the maximum
probability of reaching the bequest goal before ruining.
There exist remarks and a corollary to Proposition 3.16 for the case λ > r that are parallel to those
for λ < r, namely, Remarks 3.11 and 3.12 and Corollary 3.15. The only change is in definition of the
regions on which the optimal behaviors of waiting and buying full insurance occur. In the interest of
space, we omit those remarks and corollary.
In the following theorem, we provide the reader with a summary of the maximum probability of
reaching the bequest goal without ruining for the problem in this section. We also provide a diagram
describing the optimal insurance purchasing strategy in the case for which λ > r; see Figure 3.1. A
similar diagram applies when λ ≤ r; in that case w∗ would be 0. In the interest of space, we do not
include the corresponding summary theory for expected wealth at death.
Theorem 3.17. Divide the region R¯ = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯(D), D ≥ 0} into the following four
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regions:
R¯0 = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ w ≤
hD
r
, D ≥ b},
R¯a = {(w,D) : b−D ≤ w ≤
hD
r
,
rb
r + h
< D < b},
R¯wb = {(w,D) : 0 ≤ D ≤ Dj(w), 0 ≤ w ≤
hb
r + h
},
R¯jb = R¯ −
(
R¯0 ∪ R¯a ∪ R¯
w
b
)
.
Then, the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal without ruining is given by
φ¯(w,D) =


1−
(
hD−rw
hD
)λ
r , if (w,D) ∈ R¯0,
1−
(
(r+h)D−rb
hb
) λ
r+h
(
hD−rw
(r+h)D−rb
)λ
r
, if (w,D) ∈ R¯a,(
rw−hD
h( rbr+h−D)
)λ
r
, if (w,D) ∈ R¯wb ,
1−
(
hb−(r+h)w
hb
) λ
r+h
, if (w,D) ∈ R¯jb.
The optimal insurance purchasing strategy is as follows:
(a) If (w,D) ∈ R¯0, then do not buy any additional life insurance.
(b) If (w,D) ∈ R¯a, then buy additional life insurance only when wealth reaches b − D, after which
continually buy life additional insurance to ensure that the sum of wealth and death benefit equals b.
(c) If (w,D) ∈ R¯wb , then do not buy additional life insurance until wealth reaches the safe level
hb
r+h , at
which time buy additional life insurance of rb
r+h −D.
(d) If (w,D) ∈ R¯jb, then immediately buy additional life insurance of b− (w+D) and thereafter buy life
insurance to ensure that the sum of wealth and death benefit equals b.
4. Summary and Conclusions
We determined the optimal strategies for purchasing life insurance in order to maximize the prob-
ability of reaching a bequest goal b. When insurance is purchased by a single premium, as in Section 2,
with or without a cash value, it is optimal to wait until wealth reaches the safe level to buy additional
life insurance. When there is a cash value, then for wealth low enough, the individual will surrender all
her life insurance and thereafter follow the optimal strategy from the no-cash-value case for buying life
insurance, that is, wait until wealth reaches the safe level. If the individual has no life insurance initially,
then the existence of cash value is immaterial to her because she will not buy any life insurance until
her wealth reaches the safe level.
When insurance is purchased by a premium payable continuously, we considered two cases in Section
3: (1) instantaneous term life insurance, and (2) irreversible whole life insurance. Arguably, whole life
insurance is not irreversible due to standard nonforfeiture laws; however, in our time-homogeneous case,
no reserve develops, so there is no cash value associated with the whole life insurance policy. Thus,
either we have the extreme in which we allow the individual complete freedom as to the amount of life
insurance she purchases at any time, as in case (1), or we have the extreme in which we do not allow
the individual to reverse her purchase of life insurance once she decides to buy it, as in case (2).
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For instantaneous term life insurance, which we considered in Section 3.1, if the force of mortality
λ is no greater than the return on the riskless asset r, then the individual does not buy any additional
insurance until her wealth reaches the safe level. If the force of mortality λ is greater than the return on
the riskless asset r, and if wealth is large enough, she will follow this same strategy of waiting; however,
if wealth w is small enough, she will buy full insurance (D = b− w) for the remainder of her life.
For irreversible whole life insurance, the solution is more complicated, but if the initial death benefit
is less than b − w, then we saw the same kind of optimal life insurance purchasing strategies there: if
wealth is close enough to the safe level, then the individual will wait; if wealth is close enough to b−D,
then the individual will buy so-called full insurance. It is interesting that if the individual in Section
3.2 has no life insurance initially, then her optimal insurance purchasing strategy is identical to the
corresponding one in Section 3.1 (depending on λ versus r and her initial wealth) because the optimal
life insurance purchasing strategies in Section 3.1 are non-decreasing.
In future work, we will consider various extensions of the set up in Section 3, in which the life
insurance premium is payable continuously. We will (1) allow the force of mortality to change with
time, as well as the cost of insurance; thus, for whole life insurance, the policy will develop a cash value;
(2) maximize expected wealth at death, possibility limited by a given amount to prevent unrealistic life
insurance purchasing strategies; and (3) assume that the individual also consumes from her wealth and
wishes to maximize the probability of reaching a bequest goal without experiencing bankruptcy, possibly
including life annuities in the financial market to cover some or all of her expenses. We anticipate that
the solutions to these problems will be important because they will be directly applicable to financial
planning.
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof of (a). Observe that f1(0) = f1(1) = 0. Also,
f ′1(x) = a x
a−1 − c (1− x)c−1,
and note that f ′1(0) = −c < 0 and limx→1 f
′
1(x) = −∞. Thus, f1 has an odd number of zeros in the
interior (0, 1), say, 2k − 1, for some k = 1, 2, . . .. This fact implies that f ′1 has 2k zeros; thus, to show
that k = 1, it is enough to show that f ′1 has at most two zeros in (0, 1). The zeros of f
′
1 are those points
x that solve
xa−1(1− x)1−c =
c
a
.
So, if we define g by
g(x) = xa−1(1− x)1−c −
c
a
,
then to show that f ′1 has at most two zeros in (0, 1), it is enough to show that g
′ has one zero in (0, 1)
because g(0) = g(1) = − c
a
< 0. This result follows from
g′(x) = xa−2(1− x)−c[(a− 1)− (a− c)x],
which has a unique zero at x = a−1
a−c ∈ (0, 1). Thus, we have proved that f1 has a unique zero in (0, 1).
Proof of (b). Observe that f2(0) = 0 and limx→1 f2(x) = −∞. Also,
f ′2(x) =
c
a
(1− x)c−2 [(a− 1)− (a− c)x] ;
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thus, f2 increases on
[
0, a−1
a−c
)
and decreases on
(
a−1
a−c , 1
)
. To show that f2 is non-negative on [0, x
∗), it
is, therefore, enough to show that f2(x
∗) ≥ 0.
To this end, recall that (1− x)c ≤ 1− cx because the left side of this inequality is concave in x (so
lies below its tangents) and the right side is the tangent of (1− x)c at x = 0. From part (a), we know
that 1− (x∗)a = (1− x∗)c; thus, we conclude that cx∗ ≤ (x∗)a. Inequality f2(x
∗) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
a(1− x∗)
a(1− x∗) + cx∗
≥ (1− x∗)c, (A.1)
which will follow if we show the stronger inequality
a(1− x∗)
a(1− x∗) + (x∗)a
≥ 1− (x∗)a, (A.2)
in which we use 1− (x∗)a = (1− x∗)c and cx∗ ≤ (x∗)a. Inequality (A.2) is equivalent to
(x∗)a + a(1− x∗)− 1 ≥ 0,
which holds on [0, 1) because the left side decreases with respect to x∗ and equals 0 if x∗ = 1. Thus, we
have proved that f2 is non-negative on [0, x
∗).
Proof of (c). Observe that f3(0) = 1 and f3(1) = 0. Also,
f ′3(x) =
a
c
xa−2 [−(a− 1) + (a− c)x] ;
thus, f3 decreases on
[
0, a−1
a−c
)
and increases on
(
a−1
a−c , 1
)
. To show that f3 is non-positive on [x
∗, 1], it
is, therefore, enough to show that f3(x
∗) ≤ 0. Inequality f3(x
∗) ≤ 0 is equivalent to
cx∗
a(1− x∗) + cx∗
≤ (x∗)a,
which is equivalent to inequality (A.1) because (x∗)a = 1 − (1− x∗)c. Thus, we have proved that f3 is
non-positive on [x∗, 1].
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3.13
Proof of a. Dj(w) ≤
rw
h
if and only if
w − hb
r+hfj(w)
1− fj(w)
≤ w,
which is equivalent to fj(w) = 0, which only occurs when w = 0, or fj(w) 6= 0 and w ≤
hb
r+h . It follows
that Dj(w) ≤
rw
h
holds for 0 ≤ w ≤ hb
r+h , with equality only at the endpoints. This result confirms our
hypothesis that the line rw = hD lies in the jump region.
To prove parts (b) and (c), we will use the fact that D′j(w) is proportional to the following:
D′j(w) ∝ 1−
h
r + h
fj(w)−
r
r + h
fj(w)
1−λ
r .
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Proof of b. If λ ≤ r, then Dj(w) is increasing on
[
0, hb
r+h
]
if and only if
1−
h
r + h
x−
r
r + h
x1−
λ
r ≥ 0,
for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. This inequality holds because the left side equals 0 when x = 1, and the left side decreases
on [0, 1].
Proof of c. If λ > r, first note that Dj(w) has a unique zero at w = w
∗ because Dj(w) = 0
if and only if the expression in (3.9) equals 0. Because D′j(0) < 0, we conclude that Dj(w) ≤ 0 for
0 ≤ w ≤ w∗. Also, note that fj(w) increases on
[
0, hb
r+h
]
and equals x∗ when w = w∗. It follows that
Dj(w) is increasing on
[
w∗, hb
r+h
]
if and only if
1−
h
r + h
x−
r
r + h
x1−
λ
r ≥ 0,
for x∗ ≤ x ≤ 1, which is equivalent to f3(x) ≤ 0 for x
∗ ≤ x ≤ 1, which we know is true from Lemma 3.4.
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